summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffhomepage
path: root/include/linux
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2019-08-20SUNRPC: Remove rpc_wake_up_queued_task_on_wq()Chuck Lever1-3/+0
Clean up: commit c544577daddb ("SUNRPC: Clean up transport write space handling") appears to have removed the last caller of rpc_wake_up_queued_task_on_wq(). Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
2019-08-20memremap: provide a not device managed memremap_pagesChristoph Hellwig1-0/+2
The kvmppc ultravisor code wants a device private memory pool that is system wide and not attached to a device. Instead of faking up one provide a low-level memremap_pages for it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190818090557.17853-5-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20memremap: remove the dev field in struct dev_pagemapChristoph Hellwig1-1/+0
The dev field in struct dev_pagemap is only used to print dev_name in two places, which are at best nice to have. Just remove the field and thus the name in those two messages. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190818090557.17853-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20resource: add a not device managed request_free_mem_region variantChristoph Hellwig1-0/+2
Factor out the guts of devm_request_free_mem_region so that we can implement both a device managed and a manually release version as tiny wrappers around it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190818090557.17853-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Tested-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20mm: remove the unused MIGRATE_PFN_DEVICE flagChristoph Hellwig1-1/+0
No one ever checks this flag, and we could easily get that information from the page if needed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814075928.23766-10-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20mm: remove the unused MIGRATE_PFN_ERROR flagChristoph Hellwig1-1/+0
Now that we can rely errors in the normal control flow there is no need for this flag, remove it. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814075928.23766-9-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20mm: turn migrate_vma upside downChristoph Hellwig1-99/+19
There isn't any good reason to pass callbacks to migrate_vma. Instead we can just export the three steps done by this function to drivers and let them sequence the operation without callbacks. This removes a lot of boilerplate code as-is, and will allow the drivers to drastically improve code flow and error handling further on. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190814075928.23766-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20hmm: use mmu_notifier_get/put for 'struct hmm'Jason Gunthorpe2-17/+1
This is a significant simplification, it eliminates all the remaining 'hmm' stuff in mm_struct, eliminates krefing along the critical notifier paths, and takes away all the ugly locking and abuse of page_table_lock. mmu_notifier_get() provides the single struct hmm per struct mm which eliminates mm->hmm. It also directly guarantees that no mmu_notifier op callback is callable while concurrent free is possible, this eliminates all the krefs inside the mmu_notifier callbacks. The remaining krefs in the range code were overly cautious, drivers are already not permitted to free the mirror while a range exists. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806231548.25242-6-jgg@ziepe.ca Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2019-08-20can: rcar_can: Remove unused platform data supportGeert Uytterhoeven1-18/+0
All R-Car platforms use DT for describing CAN controllers. R-Car CAN platform data support was never used in any upstream kernel. Move the Clock Select Register settings enum into the driver, and remove platform data support and the corresponding header file. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2019-08-20irqchip: Add include guard to irq-partition-percpu.hMasahiro Yamada1-0/+5
Add a header include guard just in case. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2019-08-20irqchip/gic-v3: Warn about inconsistent implementations of extended rangesMarc Zyngier1-0/+1
As is it usual for the GIC, it isn't disallowed to put together a system that is majorly inconsistent, with a distributor supporting the extended ranges while some of the CPUs don't. Kindly tell the user that things are sailing isn't going to be smooth. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2019-08-20irqchip/gic-v3: Add EPPI range supportMarc Zyngier1-0/+12
Expand the pre-existing PPI support to be able to deal with the Extended PPI range (EPPI). This includes obtaining the number of PPIs from each individual redistributor, and compute the minimum set (just in case someone builds something really clever...). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2019-08-20irqchip/gic-v3: Add ESPI range supportMarc Zyngier1-1/+16
Add the required support for the ESPI range, which behave exactly like the SPIs of old, only with new funky INTIDs. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
2019-08-20Merge branch 'for-joerg/batched-unmap' of ↵Joerg Roedel2-37/+112
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux into core
2019-08-20gpio: Use callback presence to determine need of valid_maskLinus Walleij1-9/+0
After we switched the two drivers that have .need_valid_mask set to use the callback for setting up the .valid_mask, we can just use the presence of the .init_valid_mask() callback (or the OF reserved ranges, nota bene) to determine whether to allocate the mask or not and we can drop the .need_valid_mask field altogether. Cc: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@st.com> Cc: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay@st.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190819093058.10863-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org
2019-08-20gpio: Pass mask and size with the init_valid_mask()Linus Walleij1-1/+3
It is more helpful for drivers to have the affected fields directly available when we use the callback to set up the valid mask. Change this and switch over the only user (MSM) to use the passed parameters. If we do this we can also move the mask out of publicly visible struct fields. Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190819084904.30027-1-linus.walleij@linaro.or Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
2019-08-20gpio: stubs in headers should be inlineStephen Rothwell1-2/+2
Fixes: fdd61a013a24 ("gpio: Add support for hierarchical IRQ domains") Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190816213812.40a130db@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
2019-08-19tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open(). (Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in default_file_open()) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked downDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic instead. The following changes are made: (1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that). (2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria are permitted to be opened: - The file must have mode 00444 - The file must not have ioctl methods - The file must not have mmap (3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading. Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a miscdev, not debugfs. Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(), show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver. I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly, though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of them in loops scanning tables). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+9
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to access kernel data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed modules. Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcoreDavid Howells1-0/+1
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace moduleDavid Howells1-0/+1
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)David Howells1-0/+1
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIALDavid Howells1-0/+1
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error. Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked downDavid Howells1-0/+1
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the kernel is locked down. Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked downJosh Boyer1-0/+6
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution) and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel. (Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP environment) Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and KDDISABIO console ioctls. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked downJosh Boyer1-0/+1
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: pavel@ucw.cz cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCEJiri Bohac1-2/+2
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation. This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a signature on the image to be booted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-0/+1
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information. Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this. Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked downDavid Howells1-0/+1
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify. I have adjusted the errors generated: (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then: (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned. (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases). (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got. Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet. [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19security: Add a static lockdown policy LSMMatthew Garrett1-0/+3
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19security: Add a "locked down" LSM hookMatthew Garrett2-0/+39
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19security: Support early LSMsMatthew Garrett2-0/+12
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+14
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull kernel thread signal handling fix from Eric Biederman: "I overlooked the fact that kernel threads are created with all signals set to SIG_IGN, and accidentally caused a regression in cifs and drbd when replacing force_sig with send_sig. This is my fix for that regression. I add a new function allow_kernel_signal which allows kernel threads to receive signals sent from the kernel, but continues to ignore all signals sent from userspace. This ensures the user space interface for cifs and drbd remain the same. These kernel threads depend on blocking networking calls which block until something is received or a signal is pending. Making receiving of signals somewhat necessary for these kernel threads. Perhaps someday we can cleanup those interfaces and remove allow_kernel_signal. If not allow_kernel_signal is pretty trivial and clearly documents what is going on so I don't think we will mind carrying it" * 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: signal: Allow cifs and drbd to receive their terminating signals
2019-08-19Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nfDavid S. Miller1-0/+5
Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: 1) Remove IP MASQUERADING record in MAINTAINERS file, from Denis Efremov. 2) Counter arguments are swapped in ebtables, from Todd Seidelmann. 3) Missing netlink attribute validation in flow_offload extension. 4) Incorrect alignment in xt_nfacct that breaks 32-bits userspace / 64-bits kernels, from Juliana Rodrigueiro. 5) Missing include guard in nf_conntrack_h323_types.h, from Masahiro Yamada. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-19Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netDavid S. Miller16-29/+76
Merge conflict of mlx5 resolved using instructions in merge commit 9566e650bf7fdf58384bb06df634f7531ca3a97e. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-19Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netLinus Torvalds4-5/+15
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix jmp to 1st instruction in x64 JIT, from Alexei Starovoitov. 2) Severl kTLS fixes in mlx5 driver, from Tariq Toukan. 3) Fix severe performance regression due to lack of SKB coalescing of fragments during local delivery, from Guillaume Nault. 4) Error path memory leak in sch_taprio, from Ivan Khoronzhuk. 5) Fix batched events in skbedit packet action, from Roman Mashak. 6) Propagate VLAN TX offload to hw_enc_features in bond and team drivers, from Yue Haibing. 7) RXRPC local endpoint refcounting fix and read after free in rxrpc_queue_local(), from David Howells. 8) Fix endian bug in ibmveth multicast list handling, from Thomas Falcon. 9) Oops, make nlmsg_parse() wrap around the correct function, __nlmsg_parse not __nla_parse(). Fix from David Ahern. 10) Memleak in sctp_scend_reset_streams(), fro Zheng Bin. 11) Fix memory leak in cxgb4, from Wenwen Wang. 12) Yet another race in AF_PACKET, from Eric Dumazet. 13) Fix false detection of retransmit failures in tipc, from Tuong Lien. 14) Use after free in ravb_tstamp_skb, from Tho Vu. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (101 commits) ravb: Fix use-after-free ravb_tstamp_skb netfilter: nf_tables: map basechain priority to hardware priority net: sched: use major priority number as hardware priority wimax/i2400m: fix a memory leak bug net: cavium: fix driver name ibmvnic: Unmap DMA address of TX descriptor buffers after use bnxt_en: Fix to include flow direction in L2 key bnxt_en: Use correct src_fid to determine direction of the flow bnxt_en: Suppress HWRM errors for HWRM_NVM_GET_VARIABLE command bnxt_en: Fix handling FRAG_ERR when NVM_INSTALL_UPDATE cmd fails bnxt_en: Improve RX doorbell sequence. bnxt_en: Fix VNIC clearing logic for 57500 chips. net: kalmia: fix memory leaks cx82310_eth: fix a memory leak bug bnx2x: Fix VF's VLAN reconfiguration in reload. Bluetooth: Add debug setting for changing minimum encryption key size tipc: fix false detection of retransmit failures lan78xx: Fix memory leaks MAINTAINERS: r8169: Update path to the driver MAINTAINERS: PHY LIBRARY: Update files in the record ...
2019-08-19keys: Fix description sizeDavid Howells1-4/+4
The maximum key description size is 4095. Commit f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") inadvertantly reduced that to 255 and made sizes between 256 and 4095 work weirdly, and any size whereby size & 255 == 0 would cause an assertion in __key_link_begin() at the following line: BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0); This can be fixed by simply increasing the size of desc_len in struct keyring_index_key to a u16. Note the argument length test in keyutils only checked empty descriptions and descriptions with a size around the limit (ie. 4095) and not for all the values in between, so it missed this. This has been addressed and https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=066bf56807c26cd3045a25f355b34c1d8a20a5aa now exhaustively tests all possible lengths of type, description and payload and then some. The assertion failure looks something like: kernel BUG at security/keys/keyring.c:1245! ... RIP: 0010:__key_link_begin+0x88/0xa0 ... Call Trace: key_create_or_update+0x211/0x4b0 __x64_sys_add_key+0x101/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 It can be triggered by: keyctl add user "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" a @s Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management") Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-08-19media: lib/sort.c: implement sort() variant taking context argumentRasmus Villemoes1-0/+5
Our list_sort() utility has always supported a context argument that is passed through to the comparison routine. Now there's a use case for the similar thing for sort(). This implements sort_r by simply extending the existing sort function in the obvious way. To avoid code duplication, we want to implement sort() in terms of sort_r(). The naive way to do that is static int cmp_wrapper(const void *a, const void *b, const void *ctx) { int (*real_cmp)(const void*, const void*) = ctx; return real_cmp(a, b); } sort(..., cmp) { sort_r(..., cmp_wrapper, cmp) } but this would do two indirect calls for each comparison. Instead, do as is done for the default swap functions - that only adds a cost of a single easily predicted branch to each comparison call. Aside from introducing support for the context argument, this also serves as preparation for patches that will eliminate the indirect comparison calls in common cases. Requested-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com> Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
2019-08-19notify: export symbols for use by the knfsd file cacheTrond Myklebust1-0/+2
The knfsd file cache will need to detect when files are unlinked, so that it can close the associated cached files. Export a minimal set of notifier functions to allow it to do so. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2019-08-19locks: create a new notifier chain for lease attemptsJeff Layton1-0/+5
With the new file caching infrastructure in nfsd, we can end up holding files open for an indefinite period of time, even when they are still idle. This may prevent the kernel from handing out leases on the file, which is something we don't want to block. Fix this by running a SRCU notifier call chain whenever on any lease attempt. nfsd can then purge the cache for that inode before returning. Since SRCU is only conditionally compiled in, we must only define the new chain if it's enabled, and users of the chain must ensure that SRCU is enabled. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2019-08-19sunrpc: add a new cache_detail operation for when a cache is flushedJeff Layton1-0/+1
When the exports table is changed, exportfs will usually write a new time to the "flush" file in the nfsd.export cache procfile. This tells the kernel to flush any entries that are older than that value. This gives us a mechanism to tell whether an unexport might have occurred. Add a new ->flush cache_detail operation that is called after flushing the cache whenever someone writes to a "flush" file. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Copyright © 2025 - 2026 Wayne Cole. WTFPL. Attribution appreciated. No warranty. Not liable for bodily damages.